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Abstract
PACE, AMANDA: The Chinese Government’s Implementation of Soft and Hard Power Policies
Within Xinjiang and Tibet to Encourage Assimilation.
Department of Asian Studies, June 2012.
ADVISOR: Mark Dallas

Today there is an increasing unrest among the minority populations of China and
the government enforces different policies both to encourage assimilation and enforce
order within minority regions. My research compares two different minority regions in
China, Xinjiang and Tibet, and examines Beijing’s education, language and religious
policies within these two minority regions. Beijing uses special mechanisms to
implement these policies. I categorize these different policy realms according to their
relative power. I find that in order to achieve desired objectives, Beijing will either
enforce strict laws or fairly lenient laws depending on the policy realm. I argue that
Beijing uses a method of ‘soft power’ and ‘hard power’ policies within the different
realms. ‘Soft power’ policies are typically more covert in terms of their objectives and
implementation. Beijing uses the subtle powers of persuasion and positive incentives to
shift people’s mindsets. I use the term ‘hard power’ policy to describe more
straightforward policies. These policies tend to use force or scare tactics to enforce the
policy, such as bans and restrictions. Although there is no direct proof to explain why
Beijing uses these distinct policy approaches, I speculate as to why Beijing utilizes these
policies in different circumstances.
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Introduction
On July 5th, 2009, a series of violent riots over several days broke out in the
Xinjiang Autonomous Region’s capital city of Urumqi. The first day of the riots began as
a peaceful protest with at least 1,000 Uighur nationalists. However, the peaceful protest
quickly turned into a bloody and violent uprising. How did this peaceful protest escalate
into a series of violent attacks between the Han (“ethnic Chinese”) and the Uighur
people? Rioting began when the Peoples Republic of China sent a large police force to
Urumqi to disperse the protest and called for a full investigation of the Shaoguan
incident in southern China that occurred several days before the riot. During this brawl,
two Uighur men who worked in a toy factory were killed when a group of Han workers
murdered the men on the basis of a rumor that the two Uighur men allegedly sexually
assaulted a Han female worker (Wong, 2009). Once the Uighur in Xinjiang heard of the
murders, they began peacefully protesting in Urumqi, demanding for official action over
the unjust murders. No one can say who truly began the violence; the Uighur claim it
was the police and the police claim it was the protestors. The PRC believed that the riots
themselves were planned from abroad by the World Uighur Congress and its leader,
Rebiya Kadeer (Wong, 2009). The Chinese government began researching an “antiterrorist” law after the terrorist attack on the U.S. on September 11, 2001 and began
developing the law after this riot since it was viewed as a terrorist attack.1 For this
reason, the actions of the police may have been more aggressive than necessary. There
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were a total of 197 deaths, 1,700 reported injuries, and many destroyed buildings.2
Uighur exile groups claim that the Chinese government lessened the death toll for their
own purposes and that there was in fact a much greater death toll. Following the riots,
the PRC police force conducted a wide-scale sweep of Urumqi looking for any Uighur
who was involved in the riots or thought to of planned the protest. Many men and
women disappeared following this wide-scale sweep of the city. In the weeks following
the riots, over 1,000 Uighurs were arrested and detained, mosques were temporarily
closed and the PRC placed armed policemen within the city until January 2010. Many of
the prisoners were faced with criminal charges and over 30 people faced execution.
There have been many riots within Xinjiang on the basis of unjust treatment of minority
nationalities and fighting for religious freedom.
Many of the riots within Xinjiang are comparable to the riots that have taken
place within the Tibet Autonomous Region. For example, in 2008, the Tibetans began a
series of riots, protests and demonstrations within Lhasa, the capital city. The
demonstration began as an observance of the Tibetan Uprising Day, a day in which the
Tibetan people celebrate the 1959 Tibetan uprising against the presence of Chinese rule
within Tibet. The demonstration quickly turned into a series of violent riots where
monks and Tibetan citizens attacked Han civilians and created havoc within the city. The
PRC police force promptly intervened to prevent even more damage and arrested and
detained many Tibetan citizens. The Chinese government blamed these riots on
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separatism and claimed that the Dalai Lama organized the protests. The Dalai Lama
denied these accusations and blamed the riots on the widespread discontent among the
Tibetan people. Like the Uighur in Xinjiang, many Tibetan rioters were arrested,
detained and some were executed.3 These two examples of riots are not unique cases of
protesting; in fact, there have been at least one riot each year in Xinjiang from 19882001. In addition, in 1996 and 1997 there was a riot nearly every month (see Appendix).
The vast amount of riots presents a real problem for Beijing.
In regards to the national minorities in China, Beijing’s goals are to unify all
minority groups under one nation. Beijing is trying to achieve unification by influencing
all citizens to speak Mandarin, improving living standards, promoting Han culture,
among other methods. However, many of China’s minority groups still remain
unassimilated into Chinese society and the dominant Han culture. These minority
groups are still not a fully integral part of the Chinese nation for many different reasons.
One concern about the lack of integration is that the Chinese government fears
that a national security issue may arise if the minority groups remain unassimilated. In
Xinjiang specifically, Beijing fears Uighur connection with Pan-Turkic culture across parts
of Central Asia and its geographic proximity. The Uighur identity is associated with
Turkic culture and this presents a problem for Beijing. Beijing clearly wants the Uighur
people to see the positives of Han culture and is afraid that the Uighur will want to
separate from China to connect with a culture more similar to their own. Another
3
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reason Beijing wants Xinjiang unified with the rest of China is because of its geographical
location. Xinjiang borders Russia, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. Xinjiang’s location is extremely important for national
security because it serves as a buffer zone between China and these countries.
Beijing also worries a great deal about Tibet and how to unify its minority
nationality with the rest of China. The Chinese government fears that Tibetan identity
has an unbreakable link to transnational ties of Tibetan and other Buddhist cultures.
Today, the CCP and many Han citizens believe religion is a backwards notion. Tibetan
Buddhism is such a powerful part of Tibetan identity and it is for this reason that Beijing
fears both the lack of assimilation and even the threat of separatism. The Tibetan
people also have a powerful leader in the Dalai Lama and Beijing fears that he will unify
the people and seek greater autonomy. China wants to unify these groups under one
nation so there are no chances of separatism.
On the other hand, the CCP’s assimilation policies can create a backlash and
achieve just the opposite of its intended effect. Since many minority groups in China
perceive Beijing’s unification attempts as trying to erase their culture, many people have
participated in various forms of resistance. The most severe form of resistance are riots
and protests, while there are also more subtle forms of resistance like forming
allegiances and declaring loyalty to groups other than the government. The Chinese
government faces a major issue when dealing with promoting assimilation of minority
nationalities with China. Beijing knows that they must tread lightly when it comes to
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assimilation policies. The process is a balancing act in that Beijing must allow the
survival of minority cultural traits while still protecting the nation and not letting it
become the basis for varying loyalties. The Chinese government must keep their
interests the number one priority and it is extremely difficult to manage this balancing
act. Beijing wants to improve the living standards of underprivileged minority citizens
while also subtly altering their allegiance to China. How can China try and assimilate the
minority nationalities without these groups reacting negatively? For example, if the
Chinese government makes all minority schools celebrate a Chinese national holiday to
introduce the minority students to Han culture, the minority groups could see this as an
attempt to replace their own holidays. This balancing act is truly difficult and the
Chinese government has created different systems in which they deal with this issue.
Beijing approaches assimilation differently depending on the policy realm. For
example, the government does not handle religious policies and economic policies in
the same manner. Within these varying realms Beijing uses special mechanisms to
implement these policies. I categorize these different policy realms according to their
relative power. To achieve desired objectives, the PRC will either enforce strict laws or
fairly lenient laws depending on the realm.
I argue that Beijing uses a method of soft power and hard power policies within
the different realms. Soft power policies are typically very subtle and more covert when
implemented. Beijing uses the subtle powers of persuasion and positive incentives to
shift people’s ideas and mindset. I use the term hard power policy to describe strict
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policies that state clearly what the objective is. These policies tend to use force or scare
tactics to enforce the policy. Bans and restrictions are also associated with hard power
policies. This idea of soft and hard power policies is similar to the “carrot or the stick”
idiom in that the soft power policies often use positive incentives and the hard power
policies use strict restrictions with sanctions. Another difference between soft and hard
power policies is the difference in flexibility. Hard power policies are generally inflexible
because these policies use clear and distinct restrictions or bans that cannot be
negotiated. Soft power policies are more flexible because the government is not as strict
within its implementation. In Beijing’s case, education and language policies are two
examples of soft power policies and religion is an example of a hard power policy. The
government giving extra points to minority students on the Chinese college entrance
exam, the GaoKao, is an example of a soft power education policy because it provides
incentives for minority groups to want a proper education and participate in Chinese
society. Banning pictures and religious icons of the Dalai Lama from Tibetan households
are a hard power religious policy because there is a clear restriction. Another reason it is
a hard power policy is because if Tibetan citizens are caught with these images, the
government can use imprisonment as a form of punishment.
Although there is no direct proof that Beijing uses this distinction as a
comparison of policies, I am going to take a stab as to why there are soft power policies
and hard power policies. One possible explanation is that the Chinese government
decides to use soft power or hard power policies depending on whether there is a threat
or not. Two of Beijing’s greatest fears are threats to national security and separatism.
6

Religion presents a problem for the Chinese government in regards to both national
security and separatist thoughts. If the government sees any signs of these threats, they
will use hard power policies to eradicate the problem. Since China is a Communist
nation, the government does not want a large religious presence that could potentially
undermine their authority. Religion consists of hierarchical, organized groups that tend
to have ambitious and influential spiritual leaders. The Chinese government fears these
organizations because they worry that the people will look towards religious groups for
different services that the government is supposed to provide; for example, education
or monetary help. Beijing worries that the people will profess their allegiance to specific
religious groups rather than to the government. Religion is a threat to the Chinese
nation because religious follower’s loyalties to the organizations are very strong. This
loyalty is so strong because people usually connect themselves to just one specific
religion; there are rarely cases where someone professes allegiance to Roman
Catholicism and Judaism. Different European nations experienced similar issues in
history when the authority of the different rulers was challenged by large religious
organizations like the Vatican. The Chinese government implements hard power
religious policies to avoid these issues.
Education and language policies are soft power policies because education and
language realms do not present as much of a threat. There are no threats when it comes
to the use of language because there are few formal language organizations like religion
that could undermine the government’s authority. Also, unlike religion, there is no limit
to how many languages someone can speak and use; therefore, language does not
7

present a real threat. Education presents little of a threat because the school system is
controlled by the government; therefore, there are few alternative and organized
sources of formal education outside the purview of the CCP. Another reason that
educational policies are soft power policies is because Beijing understands that most
citizens want a decent education to improve their living standards so they will not
jeopardize this. Soft power policies and hard power policies are implemented depending
upon whether the government believes something to be a threat to their authority or
national security. Beijing will use hard power policies when there are signs that a
minority group’s loyalty and allegiance lies with a group other than the Chinese
government.
Case Study and Background
For my thesis, I decided to look at two of China’s most controversial minority
groups; the Uighur of Xinjiang and the Tibetans of Tibet. Both the Uighur and Tibetans
pose a threat to China’s national security for different reasons. Beijing has implemented
many different policies within Xinjiang and Tibet to promote Han culture and unify these
groups with the rest of the nation. I use the distinction between soft power and hard
power policies when comparing Beijing’s education, language and religious policies
within Xinjiang and Tibet.
There are 56 recognized ethnic groups within China; the Han Chinese account for
91.59% of the overall Chinese population and the other minority nationalities make up
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the 8.41% of the population.4 Although these groups make up a small percentage of the
population, they are distributed extensively throughout the country. Most of the
minority nationalities reside in the Southwest, Northwest and Northeast of China. I
chose to research the Uighur minority in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region and the
Tibetan minority in the Tibet Autonomous Region specifically. The Uighur are regionally
concentrated within China’s West in the XAR and make up about half the population of
Xinjiang. The XAR is an extremely important region because it borders Russia, Mongolia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India and has many natural
resources. The Uighur minority are a predominantly Muslim community with ties to
Central Asia. The Uighur language sounds more like the Turkish languages than Chinese.
The Uighur, being Turkic, “are as physically distinguishable from Han as African
Americans are from their European American counterparts” (Kaltman, 2007: 2). The
Uighur identity is very much linked to Islam and the Uighur language. According to Eric
Hyer, “Xinjiang is culturally, linguistically, and historically part of a Turkish civilization
distinct from the civilization that developed in China. The Turkic-Muslims of Xinjiang
have never fully assimilated into Chinese culture in the same way that many other
minority nationalities in China have. The growth of Islamic nationalism as a
transnational force makes this nationalist movement in Xinjiang especially challenging
for Beijing” (Hyer, 2006: 80). Like Xinjiang, the Tibet Autonomous Region is also
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concentrated in the Western region of China and borders Nepal, India, Burma and
Bhutan. Tibet is the traditional homeland of the Tibetan minority. Their language is
classified as a Tibeto-Burman language because it most closely resembles the Burmese
language. The major religion practiced is Tibetan Buddhism and it is extremely
important to the Tibetan people since it is the number one characteristic that defines
their identity. The Dalai Lama is the religious leader of Tibetan people and has been
condemned as a terrorist by the Chinese government. Beijing fears that the Dalai Lama
will organize the people and fight for greater autonomy or even separatism. The Uighur
and Tibetans have unique identities unlike any other group of people within China.
Beijing wants to incorporate these two minority groups into the Chinese nation to
better their livelihoods and to protect Beijing’s interests.

Education
The Chinese government has promoted a good education system for both the
Tibetan and Uighur population for multiple reasons. The first and most obvious reason is
that the Chinese want all citizens of China to have a proper education. The second and
more debatable reason is that the Chinese government wants to influence the minds of
the young minorities in order to bring more of a unity to the nation and convince the
minority youth of the benefits of Han culture. Grose argues that “state-sponsored
education has been a priority of the CCP in an attempt to unify all minorities in China
into one Chinese nation” (Grose, 2010: 97). The Chinese government is willing to
10

implement soft power policies because the state controls the education system in all
regions so it is less of a threat. Second, the Chinese government knows that most people
want a better livelihood and the primary way to achieve that is through a decent
education. Many scholars argue that by giving the minority citizens opportunities for a
decent education, the Chinese government is portrayed as saviors; therefore, the
government is able to sneak in some ulterior motives without being criticized. The
government uses soft power policy techniques such as incentives and persuasion to
achieve their goals.
The Chinese government has focused on improving the education standards for
all minority nationalities for many years. Article 46 of the Constitution of the People’s
Republic of China adopted in 1982 states that “citizens of the People’s Republic of China
have the duty as well as the right to receive education. The state promotes the all-round
moral, intellectual, and physical development of children and young people.”5 However,
some scholars argue that “the ultimate goal for the PRC’s educational policy for minority
peoples has been to integrate all ethnic groups into a single and unified socialist state”
(Grose, 2010: 97). Grose argues that “state-sponsored education is one of the CCP’s
most valuable tools for instilling minority students with ‘pro-Chinese’ principles” (Grose,
2010: 97). There can be no way of telling what the CCP’s primary goal is when dealing
with educational policies. There is no denying the fact that the Chinese government
wants to improve the education in all minority areas; however, the reason for wanting

5
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to improve the education for minorities is debated among many scholars. Regardless of
its ultimate objective, the Chinese government has implemented soft power policies
when it comes to education policies because education does not pose a threat to
China’s national security.
The Chinese government has implemented a number of preferential policies for
minority students in Xinjiang. One of the biggest policies is the lowering of the standards
on the college entrance exam (GaoKao) that minorities have to meet. This gives minority
students a bit of an advantage over their Han peers when applying for universities in
China. The CCP has also instituted a quota system at the universities in Xinjiang for
minority students (Grose, 2010: 101). Uighurs who graduate from the min kao han
Chinese boarding school and have two Uighur parents will receive 200 bonus points on
their college entrance exam; those with one Uighur parent will receive 100 bonus points
(Grose, 2010: 101). The CCP has also allocated several education subsidies to Xinjiang. In
2006, one education subsidy provided 10 billion RMB to rural areas in Western China to
improve schools. The CCP is also encouraging Uighur parents to send their children to
Chinese boarding schools in the Eastern part of China (Grose, 2010: 101).
Another preferential policy implemented in 2001 is called the “Xinjiang Class”, a
program that funds middle school-aged students from Xinjiang, mostly ethnic Uighurs,
to attend school in predominately Han populated cities located throughout Eastern
China (Grose, 2010: 97). The Xinjiang Class was modeled closely after the program
created in 1982 that funds Tibetan children to study at boarding schools in Eastern
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China. The Xinjiang Class is a four year boarding school specifically designed to educate
poor, Uighur youth from rural Xinjiang. This program was created to provide Uighurs
with a more complete education and to have better qualified teachers. The first year is
composed of preparatory studies meant to improve Chinese and English language skills,
Math, Physics, and Chemistry. After the first year, the Uighur students begin their
normal coursework for all of which Mandarin is the language of instruction (Grose, 2010:
101). The Administration Office of the Xinjiang Class selects students based on several
criteria; a quota system based on ethnicity, residence, and the family’s finances. The
second factor to being selected for the Xinjiang Class is by their performance on a test
administered specifically for the Xinjiang Class, which costs about 35-42 RMB to take.
Starting in 2007, applicants who participate in the “Loving my Chinese Nation” bilingual
speech competition can earn 5-15 additional points on the exam. In addition, students
from families who obey the birth control policy or students who are an only child will
receive five extra points on exam. Finally, students applying for the Xinjiang Class must
undergo a physical exam (Grose, 2010: 101). 80% of the Xinjiang Class’s students are
from poor, rural areas. The stated goals of the Xinjiang Class are written under Article 1
of the Administration Regulations for the Xinjiang Class. This article states, “in order for
Xinjiang to train qualified high school graduates who support the CCP’s leaders, love
China, love socialism, defend the unity of China… and are determined to offer one’s self
for socialist modernization construction , the Xinjiang Class must fully carry out the
national education and ethnic group policies (and) carry out quality education” (Grose,
2010: 132). Grose acknowledges that the political goals seem to outshine the
13

educational goals. Grose also argues that the Xinjiang Class has done the opposite of its
intended goals and “strengthened some Uighur students’ sense of ethnic identity and
has accentuated the tensions existing between Han and Uighurs” (Grose, 2010: 98).
What are the real goals of the Xinjiang Class? Is it to truly provide a better
education for the Uighur youth or is it to influence the young minds of Uighur children
to support Han culture? The Chinese government desires achieving both goals. Wang
Dan, an ethnic Han history teacher employed by Jiangsu Province’s Xinjiang Class School,
confirms that one of his most important responsibilities is to cultivate nationalism
among the Uighur students. He uses the “curious phrase qianyi mohua, which can be
loosely translated as influencing someone without their knowledge, to describe his
teaching objectives” (Grose, 2010: 102). Regardless of the CCP’s true intentions, the
Xinjiang Class presents a great opportunity for rural, poor Uighur children to receive an
education. The providing of the Uighur youth with an inexpensive education “has been
portrayed in the Chinese media as the CCP acting as a kind parent” (Grose, 2010: 103).
Many Uighur parents struggle when making the decision to send their children to a
Chinese boarding school because they know that their child will lose a sense of their
Uighur identity. Providing a good, inexpensive education for the Uighur youth is clearly a
soft power policy implemented by the Chinese government because it is based on
incentives and utilizes subtle persuasion to introduce Han culture to the children. The
different lessons taught in the Xinjiang Class schools are selected to favor Han culture,
history and language. Also, by providing a good education for the Uighur children, the
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Chinese government hopes that the Uighur students will feel a sense of gratitude
towards the Chinese government.
China’s education plans for Xinjiang have improved the education system
immensely. Grose notes that “from 1982 to 1990, the percentage of China’s Uighur
population who attended primary school increased from 37% to 43% and those who
attended undergraduate college increased from 0.1% to 2.1%. During the same eightyear span, illiteracy within the Uighur population also decreased from 45 to 26.6%.
Furthermore, by 2001, 97% of all ‘school-aged’ children in Xinjiang were enrolled in
school, and 61.8% of total in-school students were minorities” (Grose, 2010: 99). By
giving the Uighur population better educational opportunities, the Chinese government
is able to make compromises. The Chinese government is able to select what is being
taught within these schools to assist their unification goals. Selecting specific
information to be taught in the Xinjiang schools are a great example of a soft power
policy used by the PRC to influence the minds of Uighur youth to favor Han culture and
language. The CCP also publicizes atheism and selected Xinjiang histories within Xinjiang
schools. The Uighur students are taught what the Chinese government wants them to
learn. This is extremely typical of any unitary education system. The Uighur youth are
influenced by the lessons they are taught in school and there is a real fear that they will
lose their Uighur identity.
Improving the quality of education in Tibet is a big priority for the Chinese
government. Before 1950, Tibet did not have any schools for learning other than the

15

monasteries that only taught future nuns and monks the principles and teachings of
Tibetan Buddhism. Chinese occupation brought education to the average Tibetan child.
The Chinese government changed the definition of education for the Tibetan people.
Before Chinese occupation, Tibetans believed that a proper education consisted of
religious learning. Today, the Tibetan education system consists of language, history,
mathematics, and science courses. Before, Tibetan education was controlled by the
monasteries; today, the government has complete control and power over the
education system which allows Beijing to implement soft power policies.
Beijing began developing the education system within Tibet by the late 1950’s
and mid 1960’s. The first priority was to establish and fund primary schools for the
Tibetan youth. In the late 1970’s, the TAR built four prestigious college-level institutions.
Since there were new schools that provided a proper education, the Chinese
government placed Han children living in the TAR within the same schools as the
Tibetan students. This exposed the Tibetan children to Han culture. This is a soft power
policy because the Tibetan children were introduced to Han culture at such a young age.
The typical classes taught within these schools were language courses, science, math,
history, agriculture, and Maoist ideas. By teaching Maoist ideology in the schools, the
government is able to subtly introduce the Tibetan children to Communistic ideals. By
the 1980’s, there were more state funded schools, more subsidies provided for the
poorer students, and more schools that allowed boarding for the students who lived too
far away to make the daily commute. The PRC created a program in 1982 that provided
funding for Tibetan children to study in the Eastern parts of China. This program
16

provided rural or poor Tibetan children the opportunity to receive a proper education
with all of the necessary materials and strong teachers. This is evidence of a soft power
policy because the government provides Tibetan children with an opportunity to get a
good, inexpensive education. The compromise is that these Tibetan children must travel
and live in Eastern China for many years and cannot return home until the schooling is
done. The Chinese government hopes by this time Han culture leaves a positive
impression on these Tibetan students.
Even with the formation of a school system within Tibet, the 1990 Census
calculated that 44.43% of Tibetans over the age of fifteen were illiterate, only 0.57% of
Tibetans received a college education, only 2.12% received a high school education, only
3.85% received a middle school education and only 18.6% went to primary school
(Grunfeld, 1996: 226). These figures are extremely low and the government truly
wanted to increase the literacy rate among Tibetans. The Chinese government
designated 1993 as the “Tibetan Education Year” and the Chinese press wrote that 67%
of all school-age children were enrolled; however, the unbiased press wrote that poor
transportation, few schools and poor conditions made the number lower (Grunfeld,
1996: 226). In 1994, the Chinese government stated they pumped 21.5 million RMB into
education within the TAR.
However, some scholars argue that the education in the TAR schools focus less
on providing a broad education and focuses more on teaching Tibetan children why
Chinese occupation is good for their country. John Heath wrote that education today is
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more focused with “political indoctrination” than with preparing the students to
succeed in the future and become productive members among society. For instance,
Heath also provided an interesting quote from a CCP member regarding China’s goal for
the TAR education: “The success of our education does not lie in the number of
diplomas issued to graduates from universities, colleges…it lies, in the final analysis, in
whether our graduating students are opposed to, or turn their hearts to, the Dalai clique,
and whether they are loyal to…our great motherland” (Heath, 2005: 22). The Tibetan
schools spend more time making the children read quotes by Mao Zedong and studying
the policies of other Chinese leaders. Once again, this is evidence of a soft power policy
used to influence the mindset of young Tibetan children. By teaching the children at
such a young age the ideals and morals of Communism, the children may grow up with a
more Han biased nature.
The Chinese government focuses much of their attention on improving the
education system within Xinjiang and Tibet. The two main goals are to give minority
students a better education and to introduce Han culture. Beijing approaches education
policies with ease and uses soft power policies because the education system does not
pose a threat to the government. Since schools are government provided, Beijing has
complete control over the education system.
Language
The Chinese government uses soft power policies when dealing with language
issues to covertly assimilate the minority groups into one unified state by teaching
18

Mandarin. Like in most countries, there are enormous gains for residents who can speak
the dominant language; therefore, this provides great incentives for minorities to learn
Mandarin. This creates the idea that Mandarin is more important and more useful than
minority languages which allows the Chinese government to proceed with even more
language policies that favor Mandarin.
Another reason that the PRC feel safe using soft power policies is because there
are no limits placed on how many languages a person can learn or use. Since the
minority groups are able to speak their native tongue, there is not as much unrest. Also,
the government believes that minorities will not protest for the right to speak their
language more freely. This idea stems from the fact that there are few organized groups
or schools that support this notion of freedom of language. Therefore, there are no
distinct leaders to lead any campaigns. Unlike religious groups, there is no freedom of
language groups for citizens to connect with and belong to. This is because many
organizations form because of specific ethnicity groups rather than solely for a common
language. This lack of organization gives the PRC a sense of comfort and relief. The
Chinese treat “religion and language as separate. It claims that language has not played
a significant role in the emergence of violent militant actions organized by some
religious groups” (Reny, 2009: 494). Finally, even though the PRC push the usage of
Mandarin on all minorities to unite these groups into one nation, they do not feel that
these minority languages are an obstacle to modernity and social advancement like they
view religion.

19

The Chinese government has placed great importance on the preservation of
minority languages. The Political Consultative Conference in 1949 declared that the
People’s Democracy shall be the foundation for the national construction of the PRC.
This Conference created a document called the Common Program which included
Article 54 that stated simply that national minorities should have “freedom to develop
their dialects and languages, and to preserve or reform their traditions, customs and
religious beliefs.” (Dwyer, 2005: 7). However, this statement is extremely vague and
does not include specific examples as to how these languages are to be preserved.
According to Dwyer, this statement forgets to mention the fact that along with these
preservation policies, the major minority languages in China’s Autonomous Regions are
required to “share space and resources with Standard Chinese in the domains of
government administration, the courts, education, and the media” (Dwyer, 2005: 7).
Regardless, the Chinese government has implemented many different language policies
within their Autonomous Regions to promote and preserve minority languages.
Whether the preservation of these languages was actually the main goal of these
policies is unknown.
The 1980’s were a period of enormous expansion of support for minority
languages. Beijing and local governments established and revised different writing
systems and created many new language materials and programs. In 1984, Article 37 of
the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Regional National Autonomy stated that
“schools where most of the students come from minority nationalities should, whenever
possible, use textbooks in their own languages and use these languages as the media of
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instruction. Classes for the teaching of Chinese (the Han language) shall be opened for
senior grades of primary schools or for secondary schools to popularize Putonghua, the
common speech based on Beijing pronunciation.”6 The local governments were
instructed to give financial support to the compilation, translation, and publishing of
teaching materials and publications in the languages of minority nationalities (Dwyer,
2005: 35). Article 38 encouraged literature, arts and news to be spoken and written in
the minority language. This Article also supported the publication of nationality books
and the preservation of nationality historical and cultural heritage (Dwyer, 2005: 11).
Article 46 guaranteed “the citizens of every nationality the right to sue in their own
nationality spoken and written language in carrying out litigation” (Dwyer, 2005: 11).
Article 49 states that “cadres of Han nationality should learn the spoken and written
languages of the local minority nationalities”. However, most scholars note that hardly
any Hans learn more than “hello” (Dwyer, 2005: 33). By allowing the use of minority
languages, the PRC is able to show their leniency and tolerance for minority cultures.
Since the PRC allows the minorities to speak their native tongues, the Chinese
government uses this as a compromise to also introduce Mandarin. The early PRC
language policy “was part of a broader economic and social development plan, which
aimed to establish a new system of governance and society while also, crucially, building
national unity” (Dwyer, 2005: 7). The implementation and promotion of Mandarin
entailed massive propaganda campaigns to increase minority exposure to the standard
6
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Chinese language and reinforced the notion that the minority languages were not as
important as Mandarin. The PRC’s language policies are a soft power policy in general
because the government uses incentives and persuasion to influence the minority
nations to speak and write Mandarin. By placing incentives like job opportunities for
those who speak Mandarin, the government is able to exert their control and influence
in a non-aggressive manner. Specific language policies in Xinjiang and Tibet reflect this
idea that China’s government implements soft power policies to push the use of
Mandarin on the minorities.
The early stages of PRC language policy in Xinjiang were lenient. From 1954-1986,
Beijing established a language planning office called the Chinese Committee on Script
Reform, later renamed the National Language and Script Working Committee. In Urumqi,
the local branch was named the Autonomous Region Language and Script Working
Committee. This committee employed linguists to reform the region’s Arabic-based
scripts and published a flagship journal called “Language and Translation” in the five
major languages of Xinjiang (Chinese, Uighur, Kazak…) (Dwyer, 2005: 16). Creating a
special committee to develop and protect a minority language is a soft power policy
because it shows signs of equality and gave the minority groups a reason to appreciate
the government.
However, after the reform era of the 1980’s, the PRC began implementing
language policies that leaned towards the importance of instructing Mandarin over the
Uighur language. Although the use of minority languages for classroom instruction is
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protected by the Chinese constitution, “the CCP promulgates the use of Mandarin in all
social realms, and proficiency in Mandarin is a must for all minority students pursuing a
college education” (Grose, 2010: 99). The Xinjiang Education Commission has gradually
reduced Uighur-language instruction in all levels at school. Now Chinese is the language
of instruction, and Uighur is looked upon as the second language (Dwyer, 2005: 38). In
March, 2004, the Xinjiang Daily announced, “the CCP and regional government have
decided that ethnic minority schools must be merged with ethnic Chinese schools and
ethnic minority students must be mixed with ethnic Chinese students. Teaching should
be conducted in Chinese language as much as possible…some small towns and counties,
where conditions are ripe, must start teaching Chinese to first-grade ethnic minority
students in primary school” (Dwyer, 2005: 38). Schools were used as the greatest
integration tools for the minorities to become “hanified”. At the same time, teaching
Mandarin to children at such a young age provides these students with a better
opportunity to succeed later in life economically. Young Uighur students are exposed to
Han culture, language, clothing, fads and other modern elements that can potentially
influence a young Uighur to think Han culture is cooler. Combining Uighur and Han
students into one schooling system is a great example as to how the PRC use soft power
policies to try and integrate minorities into Han culture through subtle cultural
persuasion.
Whether the ultimate goal of the PRC is to push the use of Mandarin on the
Uighur or to preserve the Uighur language and culture is not clearly defined. However, I
believe that by accommodating the Uighur’s linguistic claims in Xinjiang, the Chinese
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government is able to sneak in a linguistic compromise that includes teaching Mandarin
as well. By incorporating Mandarin into the daily lives of the Uighur, some scholars fear
the Chinese language could possibly replace the use of the Uighur language. There is
also the possibility that the Uighur will utilize both languages and will have the benefits
of keeping their cultural identity and gaining more economic opportunities. According to
Marie-Eve Reny, “the bilingual education policy appears to be an indispensable
bargaining tool in the eyes of the central government” (Reny, 2009: 503).
The Uighur adults are exposed to the same subtle persuasions that Han culture
and language are more important through networks of media and scholastic elements.
Adults are influenced by Han culture and language since Xinjiang’s newspapers, the
Xinjiang Daily and People’s Daily, are translations from Chinese editions of these
newspapers. All cinema and television are legally required to be made into the Chinese
language. If a film is designated for Xinjiang, then it will be dubbed into the Uighur
language (Dwyer, 2005: 49). Beginning in 1999, all TV and radio broadcasts reduced
their full Uighur language broadcasts to a maximum of eight hours per day; Mandarin is
used for the other 16 hours of the day (Dwyer, 2005: 49). Since adults are no longer in
school, they are not provided with as many opportunities to learn Mandarin as the
young Uighur students. By incorporating Mandarin into media sources, the Uighur
adults are exposed to the language in a way that gives them a chance to hear Mandarin
every day. The Uighur adults may want to learn Mandarin as well to improve their living
standards.
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The “final step to monolingualism” was made in September of 2002, when it was
decided that Xinjiang University would no longer offer courses in the Uighur language;
even Uighur poetry is now taught in Mandarin (Dwyer, 2005: 40). All university
educators are required to have a high degree of competence in Mandarin (Dwyer, 2005:
40). Dwyer claims that the Uighur perceive this change to “monolingualism” as a cultural
attack and has done the opposite of the PRC’s goal of integration because of resentment
(Dwyer, 2005: 41). Blaine Kaltman, author of the ethnography, Under the Heel of the
Dragon: Islam, Racism, Crime, and the Uighur in China, noted that “although many
Uighur accept the need to learn Mandarin as a prerequisite to the kind of education that
will enable them to get a good job and have a better lifestyle, a large number of Uighur
simply do not want to learn a language they consider to be imposed upon them by an
alien regime” (Kaltman, 2007: 16). Kaltman illustrates the difficulty of Uighurs learning
Mandarin by comparing how an Italian can learn Spanish more easily than Russian with
the Uighur finding it easier to learn the languages of Central Asia than Mandarin. The
Uighur language looks and sounds completely different than Mandarin, resulting in even
more frustration for the Uighur population. Of the Uighur Kaltman interviewed in
Urumqi, 65% resented the fact that they needed to learn to speak Mandarin in order to
succeed financially (Kaltman, 2007: 16). Dwyer acknowledges the main issue of
preserving minority languages for the PRC by commenting that “for modern China,
which advertises itself domestically and internationally as a ‘unitary multi-ethnic
Chinese nation,’ transnational linguistic solidarities are potentially threatening to the
concept of nationhood” (Dwyer, 2005: 31). To the PRC’s dismay, many Uighur feel that
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the government has not addressed their language concerns and this may result in
actions of resistance (Reny, 2009: 505).
Tibet also faces similar obstacles in regards to the PRC’s language policies. In
Tibet, there was also a time of progressive thinking in regards to the preservation of the
Tibetan language. In the early 1980’s, written and spoken Tibetan was adopted as the
primary language in all legal matters (Grunfeld, 1996: 217). In 1983, Yin Fatang, the
former top official of the TAR, ordered that all cadres under the age of 50 learn to speak
Tibetan and that all government documents should be written in Tibetan (Grunfeld,
1996: 218). By stating that both the Tibetan language and Mandarin operate equally,
there is evidence that the PRC are trying to appeal towards the Tibetan people by
“allowing” them to speak their native tongue, but are at the same time pushing the
usage of Mandarin in everyday life. This is clearly an example of how the PRC language
policy is a soft power because it is a slow and gentle transition towards
“monolingualism”.
The Tibetan language was promoted within the education system as well. Books
used for instruction within the schools were to be written in the Tibetan language
(Heath, 2005: 23). Tibetan and Han children attended the same schools and by the late
1970’s, the children were instructed to learn each other’s languages and their classes
were taught in both languages. In 1976 Epstein observed that “on the playground, as
they ran about together they communicated in one tongue or the other, or a mixture of
both. We found it hard to distinguish them by nationality” (Epstein, 1983: 338). By
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learning the Chinese language as well as furthering their own native language, the
Tibetan children have more opportunities to get jobs in the future since there is a large
Chinese presence in the TAR. However, today, the teaching of the Tibetan language is no
longer a priority. From 1997 and on, grade one and up had to be taught in Chinese and
the only course to be taught in Tibetan was to be a “Tibetan language” course (Heath,
2005: 22). Today, the Tibetan student enrollment is much smaller than China as a whole
because the children struggle with learning Mandarin. According to Robert Barnett, the
TAR Congress in May 2002 ordered that the Tibetan language should be protected;
however, “these regulations only operate on a more theoretical level” (Barnett, 2008:
196). For example, the CCP ordered that there should be more children and science
books written in Tibetan. The influence these books have on preserving the Tibetan
language is next to nothing when Chinese is the working language and all street signs
are written in Chinese. The importance placed on the Chinese language makes it
extremely difficult for Tibetan students to go far in school and most of the time these
students feel as if they are less important than their Chinese peers. This gives Tibetan
students more of a drive to learn Mandarin so they do not have to experience any
discrimination.
Similar to Xinjiang and the Uighur nationality, the PRC eventually changed their
language policies to more Han intensified. Within Tibet, Chinese is the working language;
therefore, all street signs are written in Chinese and all formal letters must be written in
Chinese (Heath, 2005: 23). If a Tibetan wants to find a steady job within Lhasa or other
major cities within Tibet, they must be able to comprehend Mandarin since all of the
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companies are now Han companies. The PRC has proceeded with caution in regards to
its language policies within Tibet. By allowing some usage of the Tibetan language, the
government has not completely destroyed the language. The PRC use their “leniency” as
a way to compromise and order the usage of Mandarin as well. This is a soft power
policy because the PRC slowly eliminates the usage of Tibetan without being obvious. By
replacing Mandarin as the language of instruction in schools, making the Tibetan road
signs written in Chinese and providing incentives for those who comprehend Mandarin,
the PRC are persuading the Tibetan people that Mandarin is the language to know in
order to succeed financially.
The Chinese government utilizes soft power policies when dealing with language
to unify the Uighur and Tibetans with the rest of Chinese society. Assimilation is very
important to the Chinese because two of their main goals when dealing with minority
nationalities are unification and national security. Beijing believes that by teaching
Mandarin to young minority students and adults, these minority citizens will have more
opportunities in life to succeed. Also, if most citizens speak one language, a nation will
feel more unified in general. The CCP feel that soft power policies are the proper way to
achieve the government’s goals of assimilation. Beijing uses soft power policies because
language does not pose a serious threat to the government’s objectives. The first reason
is that there are no limits as to how many languages a person can speak. Secondly,
there are no organized groups fighting for language freedom that minority citizens can
pledge allegiance to or challenge the government’s authority.
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Religion
The PRC fears religion for many reasons and this fear drives all hard power
policies implemented on both the Uighur and Tibetans. First, the PRC are weary of
religion because there are hundreds of distinct religious organizations, like monasteries,
that have a massive amount of followers. The Chinese government is afraid that the
people will begin to rely on these organizations for services that the government should
be providing; for example, providing food for the hungry, an education and monetary
assistance. The PRC are afraid that citizens will profess their allegiance to these
organizations and that the organizations will undermine their authority. Religious
organizations also produce strong leaders that can influence the minds of the people.
For example, in Tibet, the Dalai Lama is the most influential spiritual leader and most
Tibetans are loyal to only him.
Second, Chinese Communist ideology believes religion is a backwards tradition
and criticizes religion on the basis that it prevents the people from reaching modernity
and progress. Grunfeld argues that Chinese Communists believe that religion prevents
or distracts people from becoming rich because they spend their money on religious
objects or donate money to religious organizations; “some poor people donate so much
to the monasteries that they become welfare recipients; others are kept in perpetual
poverty” (Grunfeld, 1996: 227). For this reason, the Chinese government tries to
eradicate religion so that the citizens can focus on monetary development.
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Third, the Chinese government understands that religion is the unifying measure
for both the Tibetan and Uighur identity and can create separatist thoughts. Religion is
considered by the CCP to be an obstacle to national integration and a potential source
of local nationalism. Finally, the issue of national security is a big issue for the Chinese
government and any signs of separatism or terrorism are a threat. It is difficult for the
CCP to disassociate Islam and Tibetan Buddhism with political instability and separatism.
For these four main reasons, the PRC implement hard power policies to control the use
of religion within the XAR and TAR.
When the PRC declared both Xinjiang and Tibet as Autonomous Regions of China,
they promised to preserve the culture and religion of the minority nationalities. In Tibet
specifically, the PRC pledged not to alter the existing political and religious system when
they wrote Article Four of the Seventeen Point Agreement; the document created in
1951 that secured Tibet as an Autonomous Region. Article Four also states that “the
Central Authorities will not alter the established status, functions and powers of the
Dalai Lama” (Heath, 2005: 99). However, the PRC did not uphold this statement and the
Tibetan’s religious leader, the Dalai Lama, has been deemed a terrorist by the Chinese
government and stripped of his power. The Dalai Lama now lives in exile in India and can
never return to his native land. By removing one of the largest aspects of Tibetan
Buddhism, the objectives and goals of the PRC in regards to religion are clearly not
preservation. In Xinjiang, the PRC also promised to preserve the culture, identity and
religion of the Uighur. However, the Chinese government has used the worldwide fear
of Muslim terrorists as a way to try to eradicate the Muslim faith from the Uighur
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population.7 Why does the Chinese government dislike religion so much? Communist
ideology in general does not believe in religion and finds religion to be a backwards
notion. This ideology stresses that religion prevents societies from achieving
modernization and progress. Religion is perceived as traditional and a tool of class
oppression in Marxist thinking. It is for this reason and many others that the Chinese
government has stepped up and cracked down on the freedom to practice religion in
China. The practice of Islam in Xinjiang and the practice of Tibetan Buddhism in Tibet are
no exception. The hard power policies on religion implemented in the XAR and TAR
greatly restrict religious freedom.
Tibet’s culture is based off of Tibetan Buddhism. Buddhism has influenced every
aspect of Tibet since the introduction and popularization of the religion as practiced by
the 33rd King of Tibet in the 7th century A.D. Tibetan Buddhism is the prime characteristic
that makes up the Tibetan identity and prevents the Tibetans from truly assimilating to
Han culture. The Chinese government uses hard power policies because religion is the
key component to the Tibetan identity and there is a fear that this will unify the Tibetan
people to fight for their independence. This is one of the reasons that Tibetan Buddhism
has been continuously under attack since the 1950’s.
The attack began when the Chinese government replaced the Dalai Lama and
created an alternative base of power and authority within the TAR. The Chinese
government still fears that the Tibetan people pledge allegiance to the Dalai Lama.
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Between 1950 and 1980 the CCP destroyed more than 6,000 monasteries and temples
and by the end of the 1970’s, a total of only eight monasteries were still open and
operating in Tibet, with less than one thousand monks still practicing. The other
monasteries that survived China’s Cultural Revolution were converted to places for
nonreligious use (Laird, 2006: 354). Thomas Laird stated “to decimate the monasteries
was to strike at the heart of Tibetan culture” (Laird, 2006: 354). In addition, many of the
adobe images of the Buddha were destroyed with pickaxes and the statues made out of
copper were smashed and thrown into the river. The statues made of precious metals
were shipped to China and used as monetary value (Laird, 2006: 346). Communists
believe that religion prevents and distracts people from making money because they
spend all of their earnings on religious icon statues, objects for religious festivals and
towards rebuilding and supporting monasteries. This is a prime example for the PRC’s
claim that religion prevents growth and progress. The Communist ideology that religion
is bad for society creates even more of a reason to place hard policies on religious
freedom. The Chinese government has implemented many different hard power policies
to destroy Tibetan Buddhism and the role of religion for the Tibetan people.
In 1994, Chinese-dominated Democratic Management Committees (DMC’S)
were set up to replace the traditional authority of abbots and lamas. Since committee
members are selected by the local branches of the Beijing-based Religious Affairs
Bureau, the Tibetan people have no say on what goes on in the XAR. The DMC’s restricts
the amount of monks and nuns at each monastery and enforces the entry level age to a
minimum of 18; the common age of entry prior to Chinese occupation was 7 (Heath,
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2005: 18). Today, leading lamas are forced to retire at the age of 60, a prime time
because of the wisdom they have gained throughout the years; this prevents “the direct
teaching of their wisdom to the young”(Heath, 2005: 18). The youth of Tibet have also
been prevented from learning the principles of Tibetan Buddhism because the teaching
of religion is prohibited in school.
The government also controls how average day citizens practice their faith.
Tibetans are not allowed to have religious artifacts, butter lamps, or pictures of the
Dalai Lama in their homes. These numerous bans are examples of hard power policies
because they are inflexible restrictions with a clear objective. During searches of
citizen’s homes by the police, altars, religious paintings, butter lamps and statues have
been confiscated and thrown away (Heath, 2005: 20). When a group of foreign
journalists were traveling in Tibet during the 2000’s, they were asked by many Tibetans
if they had pictures of the Dalai Lama in books and if they could see them briefly. The
intensity to see images of the Dalai Lama clearly illustrates their lack of religious
freedom. Today, if a Tibetan is caught watching a video of the Dalai Lama or has pictures
of the Dalai Lama within their home, they are condemned to six years of imprisonment
(Heath, 2005: 19). Using Imprisonment as a way to enforce the ban on Dalai Lama
images is clearly an example of a hard power policy because it is a form of punishment.
In 1995, a Buddhist nun named Chuying Kunsang (19 years old) shouted “Free Tibet” on
a street in Lhasa and was sent to the notorious Drapchi Prison for five years. Once she
was released, she escaped to the West and told her story. She was given flyers in prison
with China’s version of Tibetan history. She was told to write a report on Tibet’s history
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and since she did not agree with the “facts,” she was tortured three or four times a year.
Chuying said that “they wanted to brainwash me about history, and they used torture to
do it” (Laird, 2006: 369). They put electric cattle prods on her hands, lips, behind and
cheeks. This system is a clear example of propaganda enforced with torture. Chuying
said that the Chinese guards “set up this system so that after the torture the prisoners
would agree that Tibet was always a part of China” (Laird, 2006: 369).
The Chinese government also denied the Tibetan people a very important
religious tradition when they chose a different Panchen Lama (second highest ranking
Lama after the Dalai Lama) than the one recognized by the Dalai Lama. The real Panchen
Lama (who was chosen by the Dalai Lama) and his family are nowhere to be found. The
Panchen Lama chosen by the CCP is from the same village as the real one, but the “fake”
Panchen Lama’s parents are recognized members of the Communist Party. This is
evidence that the Chinese government is trying to undermine Tibetan tradition and the
Dalai Lama as a spiritual leader (Grunfeld, 1996: 244). In regards to the Chinese choice
for Panchen Lama, Chen Kuiyan, the Communist Party Secretary of the TAR in the 1990’s,
quoted that “a qualified religious leader should, first of all, be a patriot. Any legitimate
religion invariably makes patriotism the prime requirement for believers. A person who
is unpatriotic…cannot be tolerated by religion” (Heath, 2005: 19). The Chinese
government fears any religious leader because of their popularity among the people. By
replacing the real Panchen Lama with their own choice, the government is able to
control the actions of this religious leader. The PRC has no reason to fear a religious
leader under their control. The Chinese government has placed deliberate attacks on
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Tibetan Buddhism and the Dalai Lama as a spiritual leader. According to John Heath,
“the underlying problem for the Chinese is that Buddhism unifies all Tibetans and in
adversity it helps to encourage in them a sense of nationhood. It is the living symbol of
Tibet as a whole and its culture” (Heath, 2005: 20). This “living symbol” is what Beijing
fears about religion in Tibet and it encourages the government to use hard power
policies to eradicate religion.
As of today, five to six hundred Tibetans are believed to be detained for
nonviolent expression of their political or religious beliefs. There is no knowledge of the
real number of prisoners because China does not allow any outsiders to visit its prisons
on a regular basis. The average sentence for “political prisoners” in custody at the end
of 1998 was seven years, but some Tibetans arrested for peaceful protests were serving
much harsher sentences. Many prisoners also face torture, beating, unfair trials,
detention and isolation. From the time Tibetans are taken into custody until their
eventual release, they may be held in police lockups, municipal or county detention
centers, labor camps, prisons…etc. Many of these peaceful protesters never see a
courtroom and are never given the chance to fight for their rights. China’s Criminal
Procedure Law permits police to detain and hold a suspect for months while an
investigation is carried out; most of the time these “investigations” were never
completed (Aaronson, 2000: 146). According to Jeffrey Aaronson, “at present, silence,
prison, or exile are still the only options for Tibetan dissidents” (Aaronson, 2000: 168).
These are clear examples of hard power policies because the government is using force,
punishment, and scare tactics to try and destroy religion.
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The Uighur identity is greatly linked to Islamic traditions and faith, and has never
fully assimilated into Chinese culture in the same way that many other minority
nationalities in China have. The cultural differences been the Uighur and Han have
spurred the growth of Islamic nationalism in Xinjiang which presents a real challenge for
Beijing. Beijing has created hard power policies to eliminate the importance of Islam
within the Uighur culture. According to Hierman, “the intensified level of state
repression in the region encouraged the formation of organized clandestine groups able
to carry out violent targeted actions against the state” (Hierman, 2002: 51). Within the
XAR, the Chinese government focuses on protecting national security and unifying the
nation. The Chinese response to contentious religious events is the placement of hard
power policies to eradicate the Muslim faith.
Beginning in the 1980’s, the Chinese government focused on limiting the contact
between Muslims in Xinjiang and the broader Islamic world. The Chinese government
feared that the Uighur would associate themselves with the other Muslim nations and
have separatist thoughts. In order to limit communication with other Muslim nations,
the CCP in 1988 established that only hajj applicants aged 50 and older are allowed to
go to Mecca on a pilgrimage. In addition, no Chinese citizens are given permission to
study in either Iran or Pakistan (Craig-Harris, 1993: 121). These restrictions also included
forbidding meetings between Muslim clerics and foreigners; as well as forbidding
foreign preachers from entering Xinjiang. The bans placed on communicating with
neighboring Muslims are a hard power policy because it is an inflexible restriction. The
Chinese government has also prohibited the teaching of sensitive subjects such as the
36

doctrine of jihad, a Muslim holy war against everyone that is not Muslim (Craig-Harris,
1993: 121). Another subject never discussed is Uighur history for fear that it could stir
separatist thoughts because there is debate as to whether China has rightful claims to
the land and people of Xinjiang.
The 1990’s placed greater restrictions on Islamic education, and even the
construction of mosques. Many of these restrictions spurred massive riots and protests;
many of which became violent. For example, in April 1990, a riot broke out in the town
of Baran because the entire town was angered by the sudden closure of a mosque.
When the town rose in a rebellion against the Chinese, 50 pro-independence Uighur
rioters were killed by police gunfire. The Chinese police say that they were secretly
training for a “holy war” against the Han and were going to use weapons obtained from
fellow Islamic members in Pakistan (Craig-Harris, 1993: 118). After this riot, “8,000
officials in rural work teams were dispatched…to stabilize the border regions and
strengthen political organizations.” This action took place to weaken the Islamic
organizations and strengthen the state’s control of Xinjiang (Hierman, 2002: 52).
The numerous amounts of riots in the 1990’s forced the government to enforce
the Strike Hard campaign in 1996. This campaign is a great example of a hard power
policy in that it was considered a severe religious repression campaign. This campaign
was in response to Uighur nationalism and many executions and arrests resulted from
this campaign. The Strike Hard campaign also created a massive propaganda campaign
to link Uighur nationalists with the Al-Qaeda terrorists. Officials also announced that all
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Islamic publications now needed state approval (Hierman, 2002: 56). This campaign and
other drastic policies have deepened many of the Uighur’s hatred towards the Han. The
“intensified level of state repression in the region encouraged the formation of
organized clandestine groups that were able to carry out violent targeted actions
against the state” (Hierman, 2002: 51). After September 11, 2001, the number of arrests
increased sharply because of the fear of Islamic terrorism and Beijing pushed even
further the massive propaganda campaign to tie the Uighurs to Al-Qaeda.8 The CCP
claimed that more than 1,000 Uighurs had traveled to Afghanistan to train with AlQaeda and other Islamic groups (Kurlantzick, 2004: 141). According to Reny, the postSeptember 11th United States war on terrorism has “encouraged China to pursue its
Strike Hard campaign against nationalist and separatist religious militancy in Xinjiang,”
and has “further legitimized its repressive actions by linking them to the US war against
Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan” (Reny, 2009: 510). One of China’s most
important goals as a nation is national security and because of the world wide war on
Islamic terrorism, the Chinese government has placed stricter policies on the use of
religion in Xinjiang.
Today, the Chinese government focuses much of their attention on eradicating
the Islamic faith from the Uighur in Xinjiang. The PRC go about this process with hard
policies that essentially discriminates any Uighur engaged in religious activity. No Uighur
citizen can be a CCP member if they attend prayers or religious instruction. This means
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that no Muslim Uighur can participate in the government or the decision making
process on the different policies implemented in Xinjiang. The Uighur population
encounters “discrimination against those engaged in religious practice” and this
discrimination “has been maintained in the Chinese job market” (Reny, 2009: 508).
Different forms of pressure are put on Muslim Uighurs in order to discourage them from
engaging in customs considered “Islamic” or practice their religion. Public sector
employees are not allowed to wear clothing marked as religious, such as coverings for
women or embroidered skullcap for men. The Muslim Uighur population “cannot find a
job in the state or state-sponsored sectors of the Xinjiang economy” (Reny, 2009: 509).
By creating discrimination against those who practice Islam, the Chinese government
creates a monetary incentive for the Uighur to not practice religion. Any form of
purposeful discrimination is a hard power policy based on the emotional trauma and
economic difficulties for those who experience the discrimination.
The government has also conducted severe monitoring of religious activities in
Xinjiang. The CCP requires all Islamic organizations and places of worship to register
with the Religious Affairs Bureau in Beijing (Kaltman, 2007: 127). Uighurs under the age
of 18 are not allowed to receive any kind of religious instruction. In addition, all Islamic
texts are under state control. The Ulama’s, the Muslim clergy who are trained in the
study of Islamic sciences, are also controlled by Beijing (Reny, 2009: 509). Kaltman
interviewed many Uighur in the capital city of Xinjiang, Urumqi, about the subject of
religious freedom. Kaltman determined that “of the Uighur I interviewed in Urumqi… 82%
responded negatively when asked about religious freedom in China. This negative view
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was uniformly held by men and women of all ages, single and married, professional and
nonprofessional alike” (Kaltman, 2007: 43). Kaltman also noted that most Uighur in
Urumqi today only pray within their hearts as opposed to the mosques because of the
need to do business for money and that they feel uncomfortable going to the mosques
(Kaltman, 2007: 45). When Kaltman asked the Uighur in Urumqi about praying, religion,
and mosque attendance, most Uighur “were completely unwilling to discuss it and
seemed genuinely upset that I wanted to” (Kaltman, 2007: 52). According to Gladney,
“China’s Muslims are clearly the most threatened in terms of self-preservation and
Islamic identity” (Gladney, 2003: 451).
Religion is not favored in a Communist/Marxist society and the Chinese
government wants to erase religion from Tibet and Xinjiang to assimilate the minority
groups into Chinese society and to protect national security. There are numerous
reasons as to why the Chinese government fears religion. One of the main reasons the
PRC are afraid of religion is because they are nervous that minority citizens will pledge
alliance to religious groups and will not be loyal to the Chinese nation. In order to
prevent possible separatist thoughts, the government has implemented hard power
policies. These hard power policies use force, bans and scare tactics to enforce Beijing’s
main goal of eradicating religion.
Conclusion
The Chinese government is greatly concerned over the minority nationalities and
whether these groups will assimilate to Chinese society because Beijing fears any signs
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of threats to national security or separatism. The CCP believe if the minority groups
were to assimilate to Chinese society, there may be fewer threats. Beijing must carefully
approach their main goal of assimilation with minority nationalities in order to avoid
discontent among the minority groups. This balancing act of trying to achieve Beijing’s
main objective without angering the minority nationalities is an extremely difficult task.
The PRC has implemented many different policies in various realms in hopes of
achieving a unified nation without encountering problems with the minority groups. I
looked at education, language and religious policies specifically to show how the
government is using these realms to accomplish their goals. Within these realms, I argue
that Beijing uses a distinction between soft and hard power policies.
Soft and hard power policies are used by the PRC strategically. The government
uses soft power policies when there is little to no threat to national security or signs of
separatism. Hard power policies are used when the government feels there are
possibilities of threats to the nation. Soft power policy techniques include positive
incentives, subtle persuasion, flexible laws and more covert objectives. Hard power
policy techniques include strict bans, clear restrictions, force, punishment, inflexible
laws, and less covert objectives. In China, education and language policies are soft
power for multiple reasons. One reason that education policies are soft power is
because the government has complete control over the education system. One example
as to why language policies are soft power is because there are no restrictions on how
many languages a citizen is allowed to speak. One main reason that religious policies are
hard power is because Beijing fears minority citizens will proclaim allegiance to an
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organized religious group that could undermine the government’s authority. These
different policy realms seem to clearly indicate that Beijing uses different tactics
depending on the government’s view as to whether something is a threat or not. The
Chinese government implements these policies to achieve their goals of assimilation and
the protection of a unified nation.
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Appendix
Year

Month

Protest Description

Premeditated
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(Hierman, Brent. “The Pacification of Xinjiang, Uighur Protest and the Chinese State, 1988-2002”,
Problems of Post-Communism, May/June 2007. M.E. Sharpe Inc., pg. 48-61)
A list of riots and protests within Xinjiang from 1988-2001. This chart outlines when and where
the riots occurred and whether there was premeditated violence or not. There was at least one
riot every year from 1988-2001 in Xinjiang.
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